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Abstract 
Events during which a safe go-around was not achieved have been brought to the attention of the BEA 
(Bureau Enquête Analyse pour la Sécurité de l'Aviation civile – French Safety Board) due to their noticeable 
increase since the 2000s. Considering the greater risk associated with the go-around manoeuvre, currently 
defined as a normal phase of flight, the BEA has decided to undertake a study named ASAGA (Aircraft State 
Awareness during Go Around). The study aimed at identifying the weaknesses of the system during go-
around manoeuvres regardless of the type of aircraft and the airline operational procedures. In this context, 
the analysis relied mainly on three components: (1) Safety events (incidents / accidents); (2) Large scale 
survey; and (3) Flight simulations. Experiments were conducted using two long-range full flight simulators with 
operational pilots. This paper presents the method used to conduct the experiment and some of the resulting 
data, as well as some initial conclusions. The data included: video camera recordings for task analysis; 
recordings of the ocular activity of the two pilots; and debriefings. The eye trackers were used to analyze the 
pilot’s scanning patterns and the distribution of their attention during this particular flight phase. The 
debriefings consisted of interviews, based on the self-confrontation technique, which enable the pilots to self-
assess their actions and situational awareness. Eleven crews from three French airlines participated to the 
simulations. The scope was not explained to them to prevent any anticipation. Each crew performed the same 
scenario from take off to landing that included three go-around manoeuvres. The first results indicate some 
concerns related to the cooperation between controllers and aircrews in such demanding occurrences, some 
lack of understanding of cockpit automatisms and failures in crew resource management. Results are 
discussed in terms of potential improvements of the Human Machine Interface, pilots-controllers interactions 
and task sharing within the aircrew.  
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Introduction,  
Events during which a safe go-around was not 
achieved have been brought to the attention of 
the BEA (Bureau Enquête Analyse pour la 
Sécurité de l'Aviation civile – French Safety 
Board) due to their noticeable increase since the 
2000s. Considering the greater risk associated 
with the go-around manoeuvre, currently defined 
as a normal phase of flight, the BEA has decided 
to undertake a study named ASAGA (Aircraft 
State Awareness during Go Around). The study 
aims at identifying the weaknesses of the system 
(composed by the crew, the aircraft and the 
controller) during go-around manoeuvres 
regardless of the type of aircraft and the airline 
operational procedures. In this context, the 
analysis relies mainly on three components: (1) 
Safety events (incidents / accidents) analysis; (2) 
a large scale survey and (3) a flight simulator 
experiment. 
 
The objective of the simulations lied on the 
confirmation of the results uncovered by the event 
analysis and the large scale survey. The 
observation of the crew during the performance of 
the real activity, as well as data related to their 
visual scan, are necessary to understand the 
mechanisms that lead to unstabilized go-around. 
Eye tracking offers a fruitful perspective to assess 
the pilot’s performance since visual perception is 
a key for pilot to control the flight (Kasarskis& al., 
2001; Mumaw&al., 2001) 
In addition, go-around is a rare and risky 
manoeuvre, the observation in the real context 
was obviously unrealistic. Therefore, the use of 
high-fidelity simulation was essential to recreate 
the dynamics of the situation. 
 
This paper presents the method used to conduct 
the simulations, the analysis of the resulting data, 
and some initial conclusions. A global report of 
the ASAGA study will be later published by the 
BEA, it will detail all these elements as well as the 
other components of the study. 
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Method 
Simulation settings 
The experiments were conducted using two long-
range full flight simulators (B777 and A330). 
 
Scenario 
A realistic flight scenario was built with the 
participating airlines from take off to landing. The 
flight lasted 2 hours and contained three go 
around manoeuvres:  
- A first one at low level with a low altitude 
gain, initiated at the request of the ATC. The 
trajectory was modified by the ATC; 
- A second one initiated by the crew (due to 
downwind); 
- A third one due to a lack of visibility. 
 
Detailed scenario 
The flight was planned to depart from Bordeaux 
inbound to Lyon. The aircraft has several hours of 
autonomy and no particular meteorological conditions 
are expected. ATC instructs the crew to perform a go 
around at 200ft due to an occupied runway. Contrary 
to the procedure, ATC requests that the crew turn left 
340 degree and climb to 2,500ft. The crew diverts to 
Marseille. They perform a standard ILS approach 
during which the simulated wind progressively turns 
downwind its strength increases up to 15 to 20knots.  
ATC only informs the crew about this change in wind 
direction during short final. Controllers also limit the 
altitude to 2,000 ft instead of 3,500ft during the go 
around. The crew continue their flight (LOC DME). 
Visibility is then nil, leading the crew to perform a 
third and last go around. 
 
Data collected 
Direct observations (simultaneous and video 
recordings) 
Video (Hd) was used to record all the displays 
and all the communications to allow an accurate 
post-analysis. 
Observations were carried on during the entire 
scenario by two human factors specialists inside 
the cockpit and by two investigators with the help 
of a remote video streaming. 
Subjective assessment 
The debriefings consisted of interviews, based on 
the self-confrontation technique, which enabled 
the pilots to self-assess their actions and their 
situational awareness. 
Visual scan 
The objective was to analyze the pilots’ scanning 
patterns and the distribution of their attention 
during the go-around. Two synchronised 50Hz 
Pertech head-mounted eye trackers were used 
(0.25 degree of accuracy). 12 areas of interest 
(AOI) on the cockpits were defined as follows: 1) 
primary flight display, 2) speed, 3) artificial 
horizon, 4) altitude, 5) heading, 6) flight mode 
annunciator (FMA), 7) navigation display (ND), 8) 
electronic centralized aircraft monitor (ECAM), 9) 
left multipurpose control display unit (MCDU), 10) 
right MCDU, 11) visual scene, 12) flight control 
unit (FCU). A 13th AOI was considered in order to 
collect the ocular fixations out of the other twelve 
previous (out of zone, OZ). 
 
Sample 
Eleven crews (one captain and one first officer) 
were recruited from three French airlines. Each 
crew performed the same scenario, i.e the three 
go-around manoeuvres. This represents a sample 
of 33 go around (GA) according to the following 
experimental plan:  
 
 A/C GA1  GA2  GA3 
Crew 1-6 
(1 airline) 
Boeing Captain PF/ 
Co-pilot PNF 
Captain PNF/ 
Co-pilot PF 
Crew 7-11 
(3 airlines) 
Airbus captain PF/ 
Co-pilot PNF 
Captain PNF/ 
Co-pilot PF 
 
Protocol 
All participants were volunteers and the objectives 
were not explained to them to prevent any 
anticipation. Each session lasted at least 4h30 
and consisted of the following steps: briefing (30 
min); installation in the cockpit (equipped with the 
data recording kits) (30min); flight (2h); debriefing 
(1h30). 
 
Results 
The results presented in this paper are limited to 
the first 11* go around (GA1) which contain the 
most interesting results. Temporal aspects, visual 
patterns and task analysis are described and then 
discussed. *Some results are for only 10 GA out of 11 
because of a small modification of the scenario for one crew. 
 
Temporal aspects 
The timing of actions during GA1 was measured 
monitored from the beginning of the controller’s 
clearance to the stabilisation at heading 340° and 
altitude 2500 ft (Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1 : Temporal aspects 
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Regarding the 10 GA1, the total duration ranges 
from 1min00s to 1min40s. Figure 1 indicates the 
elapsed times to select the altitude and the 
heading modes and values corresponding to the 
controller’s request. They respectively range from 
20 to 51s and from 16 to 37s.The duration ranges 
emphasise the variability of crews’ strategies and 
the resulting variety of situation dynamics. 
 
Visual Scan 
 
 
Figure 2 :  Percentages of time spent per AOI during 
GA1.The error bars represent the standard deviation. 
 
  
PF the PF’s attention was 
generally focused on the 
basic navigation information 
from the PFD 
PNF the PNF’s attention 
was more diffused compared 
to the PF 
Figure 3 :  Representative heat maps of GA1.  
 
Figure 2 presents the percentages of time spent 
per area of interest during the first Go-around. 
The PF were more focused on the horizon (50% 
average) compared to the PNF (12.5% average). 
Conversely, the PNF spent more time gazing Out 
of Zone (23.9% vs 4.1%), on the FCU (17.1% vs 
4.6%) and on the ND (11% vs 4.4%).  
 
The distribution of the time spent on the several 
cockpit equipments were also analysed for both 
PF and PNF. Distinct homogeneous groups, 
based on one or several areas of interest (some 
AOI cannot be dissociated), have been identified. 
The figures below (Figure 4 and Figure 5) present 
the hierarchical classification of these groups 
based on the percentage of time spent on them. 
Regarding the PF (Figure 4), the artificial horizon 
elicits the higher fixation times (Group 1). The 
second mostly fixated group (Group 2) is 
composed by SPEED and ALT/VARIO. 
Regarding the PNF, the OZ elicits the higher 
fixation times (Group 1), followed by the FCU 
(Group 2) and the AOI group composed of 
speed/ND / artificial horizon.  
 
Figure 4 : percentage of fixation time on the various 
instruments of the cockpit for the PF 
 
 
Figure 5 : percentage of fixation time on the various 
instruments of the cockpit for the PNF 
The statistical analysis indicates that the PF’s and 
PNF’s eye movements were significantly different. 
Although they did not pay the same attention in all 
AOIs, all PF constitute a homogeneous group in 
terms of eye movements as well as all PNF. This 
means that PF tended to spend the same 
percentage of time on the various AOI during 
GA1. This applies to PNF as well. However, the 
trajectories/paths of the eye movement for PNF 
are not homogeneous. PNF did not watch the 
AOIs in the same way, nor according to the same 
sequence. 
  
0.0
10.0
20.0
30.0
40.0
50.0
60.0
70.0
PF
PNF
GA1 Group 1 
HORIZON 
52% 
Group2 
Speed 
12% 
Group2 
ALT 
11% 
Group3 
FMA 
6% 
Group3 
FCU 
5% 
Group3 
ND 
4% 
Group3 
Hors 
Zones 
6% 
Group3 
ECAM 
2% 
Group3 
HDG 
2% 
Group3 
EXT 
1% 
PF 
% time spent 
Group 1 
Out 
Identified 
Zones, 
25.70% 
Group 2 
FCU, 
17.10% 
Group 3 
speed, 
13.20% 
Group 3 
HORIZON, 
12.40% 
Group 3 
ND, 
11.00% 
Group4  
ALT, 
7.20% 
Group4  
FMA, 
5.80% 
Group4  
ECAM, 
3.40% 
Group4  
HDG, 
1.30% 
Group4  
EXT, 
1.00% 
PNF 
% time spent 
4 
 
Task analysis 
The go-around manoeuvre consists in rapidly 
bringing the aircraft in an ascending profile 
according to an assigned trajectory. To manage 
this trajectory, once the go-around is initiated, 
crews had to take into account the vertical and 
heading constraints given by the controller while 
managing automatisms. The results of the task 
analysis corresponding to these different actions 
are presented in the following paragraphs. Their 
complete description falls beyond the scope of 
this paper; hence, the results are limited to the 
noticeable deviations or adaptations that are 
safety-relevant. 
 
Initialisation 
The Go-around initialisation consists in applying 
TOGA mode, in setting the adequate thrust and in 
retracting the flaps one step.  
For the eleven sessions, this initialisation was 
performed without major difficulties or failures by 
the crews: all of them initiated the go-around at 
the request of the ATC, all applied the adequate 
thrust, the TOGA mode, and retracted flaps one 
step. A normal variability can be observed: 
absence of the go-around announcement, error of 
step in the flaps retracting request etc... All these 
approximations were nevertheless compensated 
within the crew. 
 
Positive climb callout and Gear up 
The expected sequence of actions is as follows: 
the PNF tells the PF when the variometer 
becomes positive, the PF orders “gear up”, and 
the action is executed by the PNF. 
The eleven crews moved the gear up; seven of 
them followed exactly the expected sequence. For 
the others, small adaptations can be noticed : in 
two cases the PF (instead of PNF) announced the 
positive climb, one PF ordered the gear up not by 
an announcements but just by pointing it with the 
finger and one PF moved the gear up without any 
announcement. 
 
Management of ATC clearances (heading and 
altitude) 
Ten GA1 out of the eleven were requested by 
ATC with the following communication: “XXX go-
around, runway occupied , turn left heading 340 
and climb 2500ft”. The expected response 
consisted of: (1) `read back by the PNF; (2) 
selection of 340 and of the heading mode, 
selection of 2500 and altitude mode.  
The ten crews reacted in different ways; most of 
them broke their reaction in two steps. Indeed 
more than half of the crews re-contacted the ATC 
to obtain clarifications either at the PNF’s (two 
cases) or at the PF’s (four cases) initiative. For 
them, the heading and altitude selection was 
performed within 30-40s. One crew read back the 
go-around adding “standby” and contacted the 
ATC 30s after. 
For the three others who took into account the 
clearances in one step, some deviations and 
approximations can be noticed: An error in the 
altitude read back and an error in the altitude 
mode selection (directly detected by the PF); An 
an error of the lateral mode selection; An 
immediate selection of the clearances provided by 
the PF but the read back by the PNF only one 
minute later. 
 
Modes management 
Initial modes announcement 
In case of a mode change, the expected 
behaviour is the announcement by the PF and the 
check by the PNF. This expected behaviour, 
depending on the airline, is either described in the 
Go-around procedure or in the general operation 
procedures. 
 
The figure 6 presents for each rank of change (1
st
 
mode change, 2
nd
 mode change...), the number of 
sessions concerned by this rank. It also presents, 
for these sessions, the number of announcements 
and checks performed by the crew. For example, 
9 sessions had at least 3 mode changes, the third 
change was announced by 5 PF out of the 9 and 
checked by 5 PNF.  
The initial modes were announced by seven PF 
(out of ten) and were checked (with an 
announcement) by five PNF. One PNF 
announced the initial modes. Thus, two crews did 
not announce at all the initial modes. 
 
 
Figure 6 : Mode changes and announcements 
 
Announcement of the following modes 
The expected sequences of modes for the go 
around were disrupted by the ATC request and 
the adaptations performed by pilots to adhere to 
this request. These disturbances induced in 
certain cases a consequent number of mode 
changes in a rapid sequence. 
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(considering the active modes only). These 
changes (especially the fifth and the followings) 
were only succinctly announced by crews (figure 
6). 
 
Mode selection 
In order to modify the go around trajectory as 
required by the ATC, the crews had to select the 
“heading” and “altitude” modes. Some crews had 
difficulties in the selection of these modes. 
Twice, the HDG mode was not selected by the 
PNF, the two PF detected the error of selection: 
“heading sel”, “please activate the hdg”, 
For one crew, the heading mode was selected 
during a short time, but the PF (unaware of this 
activation) ordered the PNF to “pull” the button (to 
activate the mode), the PNF pushed the button 
and the navigation mode was thus engaged. The 
error mode selection remained undetected. 
 
Trajectory management 
The following of the requested trajectory is 
subjected to variability inherent to the high 
constraints imposed on the crew. Small altitude 
deviations occurred due to the aircraft inertia or 
due to the more or less accurate following of the 
Flight Director. Approximations of the heading 
also occurred. For example, some crews 
immediately acknowledged the ATC request to 
turn left and anticipated the selection of a precise 
heading. 
Besides this small variability, more considerable 
horizontal and vertical trajectory deviations 
occurred.  
In the horizontal plan, there were 3 major 
deviations from the requested 340°:  
 
Until 300° for a first crew 
The PNF read back 340 and input 240 in the FCU. The PF 
checks the heading mode selection and follows the FD. The 
error in the value is not detected. The deviation is detected by 
ATC who informs the crew. 
Until 320° a the second crew 
The 340 heading is correctly selected by the PNF. The PF 
repeats the modification requests “left turn, 2500ft”. He 
initially executes a left turn, without following the Flight 
director He said during the debriefing “I had adequately 
understood the altitude but I was not sure about the heading. I 
could see the FD on the right while we had to go on the left, 
so I overshot”. The PNF says during the debriefing that he 
monitored the speed and the altitude: “I didn’t see the .FD.”. 
From 325° to 030°fo a third crew 
Heading 340 was adequately displayed but the heading 
mode was not selected. The PF initiates a left turn until 325 
without any FD following, detects the first lateral deviation 
(“heading 340, I overshot”), follows the FD, which indicates 
the steps to follow the FMS GA procedure (NAV mode). The 
aircraft heading reaches 030. The PF realises that the A/P is 
re-engaged and that the aircraft starts a right turn as expected 
in the initial trajectory. 
 
Large deviations from the requested 2500ft also 
occurred in the vertical dimension: 
 
until 3000ft for two crews 
The crews acknowledge the 2500ft limit while the 
aircraft is at 3500. They chose two different strategies: 
i) altitude 3000 selected in the FCU and ask 3000 to 
the ATC ii) 2500 selected and execution of an open 
descent. 
until 3900ft for a third crew 
An overshooting of 1400ft that can be decomposed in 
three phases: 
+400ft before the confirmation of the altitude with ATC 
+600ft with Vertical Speed +3800 
+400ft due to the “aircraft inertia” Vzmax >3800ft/min, 
C-Chord alarm (40 secondes) 
 
Subjective assessment 
During the debriefings, crews were systematically 
interviewed about their priorities and difficulties 
encountered during the first go around. Their 
testimonies are not transcribed in this paper but 
parts of them are used in the following discussion. 
 
Discussion  
Results show that all crews performed the go-
around manoeuvre at the request of the 
controller. The initialisation and the move of the 
gear up were executed in a homogeneous 
manner within the crews. On the other side, the 
execution of the manoeuvre differed depending 
on the strategy chosen by the crew and on their 
execution of the expected tasks.  
Interesting measures of the pilot’s activity were 
extracted from eye tracker data. They reveal that 
the PF was mainly focused on the trajectory 
execution since he assimilated mostly information 
related to artificial horizon, speed, 
altitude/variometer. The assimilation of such 
information was achieved within a reduced space 
(i.e. on the PFD) and required up to 70% of the 
visual attention. This indicates that the task of 
flying the trajectory was quite exclusive for the PF. 
On the contrary, the PNF’s visual attention was 
more dispersed. The PNF mostly captured the 
necessary information within the out of zone, 
which roughly corresponds to the aircraft 
configuration management (gears, flaps, radio 
panel or overhead panel). This is coherent with 
the different tasks affected to the PNF: « positive 
climb » announcement, gear up; read back of 
ATC request and consideration of the constraints 
(selection of the heading, of the altitude values, 
and of the corresponding modes); monitoring the 
initialization of the GA; monitoring the PF actions 
and the FMA modes. 
During debriefing, almost all PNF reported 
difficulties related to the management of all these 
actions:  
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- related to the ATC request : « I didn’t retain all 
information hopefully you did» ; « a heading left 
but I don’t remember» ; « I couldn’t answer him» 
- related to the (auditory) overload and the 
actions’ prioritization : "the info of colleague, at 
the same time, ATC request heavy, painful". "capt 
requests added to the ATC demands, so much." 
"the management of priorities between thrust, 
trajectory, FMA and "ear". 
- related to the impacts of overload on actions or 
announces to be performed : « I took time, I 
delay, I did not announce the vario for the gear 
up » ; « I mix everything » 
 
To cope with the peak of workload, crews reduced 
the demand, and/or adapted their response.  
Some of them chose for example to differ their 
consideration of the ATC modification. This led, in 
certain cases, to large vertical deviations. 
The adaptations consisted mainly in simplifying 
some tasks and prioritising actions. For example, 
the announcement of the FMA modes was 
frequently omitted by pilots, whereas they 
previously announced them. This is a typical 
situation where an increase of workload can divert 
resources from maintaining the situation 
awareness. One crew, for example, erroneously 
believed that the heading mode was engaged 
whereas they were in navigation mode. A 
subsequent deviation occurred in their 
management of the horizontal trajectory (from 
325° to 030° compared to the 340° requested). 
This kind of issues have already been largely 
discussed in the literature, especially by Sarter et 
al. (2007): “A loss of mode awareness can lead to 
mode errors, which occurs when a pilot performs 
an action appropriate for the assumed, but not the 
actual system state”. 
 
Besides, the observed horizontal deviations 
highlight the multiplicity of information sources 
related to the management of the lateral 
trajectory:  
-  “to the left” requested by ATC 
- “340” requested by ATC 
- The Flight Director 
- The heading information under the horizon 
- The trajectory monitoring indicated on the ND 
Under nominal situations, all these information are 
coherent and some are even redundant. Under 
critical situations, the precision and validity of 
these data may differ. The PF might not have the 
necessary resources to apprehend the various 
sources and the PNF’s (or even ATC’s) 
monitoring role is therefore crucial. 
 
The diversity in PNF visual scan patterns and the 
fact that some deviations were undetected, as 
well as the difficulties expressed by PNF during 
the debriefing confirmed that the monitoring task 
was not easily performed during go-around.  
Considerable mental effort is required to keep 
attention moving between the tasks. As 
expressed by Dismukes & al. (2001), “the most 
commonly [reported] category of neglected tasks 
is monitoring (of aircraft position or status or of 
actions of the pilot flying/taxiing)”.  
 
PNF had difficulties to prioritise their attention 
focuses. When PF were asked about their 
priorities in debriefing, they are quite unanimous: 
« pitch, thrust, trajectory management ». PNF 
answers were more complex and differed as they 
reported: « aircraft climbing, trajectory, pitch, 
monitoring, thrust, announcements… ».  
 
The CRM (Cockpit Resource Management) plays 
a crucial role during go around as a barrier 
against accidents. Firstly, the procedure relies on 
an effective teamwork, and particularly on the 
monitoring of deviations by the PNF. Secondly, 
previous events have shown the existence of 
potential attention tunneling during Go around 
maneuver; CRM is one of the current 
countermeasures against this phenomenon. 
However as explained in previous paragraphs, PF 
and PNF might have different priorities especially 
during the initialization. If the go around becomes 
not nominal, it might be difficult for them to 
exchange within the crew and share the same 
situation awareness. The CRM can fail in such 
demanding situations.  
 
Conclusion 
The survey emphasized potential issues when the 
ATC changes the published missed-approach 
track during the go-around manoeuvre. With the 
experiment, we confirm that in this case crews 
can be destabilised by the difference with the 
briefing during the approach. The consequences 
of these changes can be significant, particularly 
when they prevent the use of certain automated 
systems and increase the temporal pressure. In a 
flight phase where the workload is already high, 
additional actions further disrupt teamwork, and 
monitoring by the PNF in particular.  
The results of the simulations highlight the 
importance of monitoring by the PNF during the 
go around. They also show that PNF have 
considerable difficulties to monitor all the 
parameters requested for the procedure. 
The simulations show that, because of the great 
diversity of go-around situations, the number of 
changes in FMA modes during the go-around can 
be unexpectedly high. This makes it difficult for 
crew members to detect and follow all the mode 
changes. Thus, the robustness of go-around 
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procedures cannot be assessed based solely on 
the assumption that FMA mode changes have 
been comprehensively read and understood. 
The analysis of accidents or serious incidents 
performed in the ASAGA study showed that crews 
are often no longer aware of the basic parameters 
–pitch, thrust – and their correlation with changes 
in calibrated airspeed and vertical speed. Results 
of the simulations confirm, if need was, that 
performing the go-around requires a high number 
of actions. Crews may have difficulty in prioritizing 
their actions and may omit to continuously monitor 
these parameters. 
In summary, the experiment in simulator confirms 
and expands on earlier findings providing from the 
events analysis and the safety survey. 
Besides, it emphasized the potential gain 
obtained by using combined approaches (eye 
tracking data, task analysis and debriefing) and 
raises the question of the use of such a method 
for training purposes. 
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